GATT as a Framework for Multilateral Negotiations on Trade in Legal Services by Menegas, Dean N.
Michigan Journal of International Law 
Volume 7 Issue 1 
1985 
GATT as a Framework for Multilateral Negotiations on Trade in 
Legal Services 
Dean N. Menegas 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil 
 Part of the International Trade Law Commons, Legal Profession Commons, and the Transnational Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Dean N. Menegas, GATT as a Framework for Multilateral Negotiations on Trade in Legal Services, 7 MICH. 
J. INT'L L. 277 (1985). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol7/iss1/16 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Journal of International Law at University of 
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of 
International Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
GATT as a Framework for
Multilateral Negotiations
on Trade in Legal Services
Dean N. Menegas*
Barriers to the practice of law by foreigners exist in the laws of most nations.
No global multilateral agreement currently regulates transnational legal practice.
Properly modified, the concepts and procedures of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 2 which regulates national barriers to trade in goods,
could provide an effective framework for multilateral negotiations on trade in
legal services.
The fundamental GATT obligations contained in the national treatment provi-
sion3 and the most-favored-nation clause, 4 and GATT methods of creating excep-
* Class of 1986, University of Michigan Law School.
1. See generally TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PRACTICE (D. Campbell ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as
TRANSNATIONAL PRACTICE]; S. CONE, THE REGULATION OF FOREIGN LAWYERS (3d ed. 1984).
All barriers arise either from the laws of national and regional governments or from the regulations
of national and regional bar associations. This note assumes that the national governments of the
GATT signatories have the authority to negotiate reductions in the barriers discussed. Whether such a
situation actually exists is a point of contention in a number of jurisdictions, notably the United
States. A recent student note suggests that the federal government does have the power to regulate
foreign attorneys, despite the power of state bar associations and the tradition of state regulation of the
legal profession. See Note, Providing Legal Services in Foreign Countries: Making Room for the
American Attorney, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1767, 1812-22 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, Making
Room].
2. General Agreement on Tariffs and Tiade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter cited as GATT]. The GATT has been modified in
several respects since 1947. The current version is reprinted in 4 CONTRACTING PARInS To GAIT,
BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS (1969). Throughout this note, the term GATT will
be used to refer both to the treaty and to its signatories.
3. The GATT national treatment provision requires that imports be accorded "treatment no less
favourable" than domestic products with respect to all laws and requirements affecting the products'
"offering for sale." GATT, supra note 2, at art. II1, para. 4. It further requires that no internal taxes,
laws, or regulations be applied "so as to afford protection to domestic production." Id. at art. HI,
para. 1.
4. The GATT most-favored-nation (MFN) clause holds that any advantage, favor, privilege, or
immunity granted to a product of any country by a contracting party must be granted to the like
products of all other contracting parties. See GAT, supra note 2, at art. I.
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tions to those obligations, 5 could be adapted to an agreement on legal services.
GATT policies regarding quotas6 could also play a role in this agreement, as
could the concept of reciprocity.7 The negotiators of such an agreement could
utilize the GATT negotiation procedures employed during the Tokyo and Ken-
nedy Rounds of trade negotiations, 8 and incorporate GATT dispute settlement
mechanisms. 9
While a number of commentators have discussed the adaptability of the GATT
to problems of trade in services, 0 none have specifically addressed its ap-
plicability to lawyering or other professional services. Part I considers the
GATT's progress on services issues to date. Panrt II identifies and classifies the
barriers to transnational legal practice. Part III explores the possibility of liber-
alizing many of these barriers through the application of GATT substantive
concepts and the use of GATT procedural mechanisms.
I. THE GATT AND TRADE IN SERVICES
With few exceptions, the GATT presently deals only with barriers to trade in
goods." The Agreement's language does not expressly exclude services, how-
ever, and GATT parties have often attempted to include services in the organiza-
tion's negotiations. The first of these attempts came in 1959, when GATT
members approved a recommendation on freedom of contract in transport insur-
ance. 12
The Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN) failed to make
much progress in the area of trade in services, despite the expectations and efforts
of U.S. negotiators. Some of the negotiated agreements, or "codes," do directly
5. See id. at art. XX, XXI.
6. See id. at art. Xl.
7. The concept of reciprocity is most clearly enunciated in GATT, id. at art. XXVIII (bis).
8. The Kennedy Round, held in Geneva from 1964-67, was the sixth round of GATT tariff
negotiations. The Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN), the seventh and most
recent GATT round, focused on the reduction of non-tariff barriers to trade in goods. It was held in
Geneva from 1973-79.
9. See GATl', supra note 2, at arts. XXII, XXIII.
10. See, e.g., R. SHELP, BEYOND INDUSTRIALIZATION 167-69 (1981); Note, Liberalization of
International Trade in the Service Sector: Threshold Problems and a Proposed Framework Under the
GATT, 5 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 371 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Threshold Problems]; Note,
Legal Problems in Expanding the Scope of GATT to Include Trade in Services, 7 INT'L TRADE L.J.
281 (1982-83) [hereinafter cited as Note, Legal Problems].
II. Throughout the GATT there are specific references to goods as well as to concepts such as
tariffs and dumping which generally relate more to goods than to services. See J. JACKSON, WORLD
TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 529 (1969).
12. R. KROMMENACKER, WORLD-TRADED SERVICES: THE CHALLENGE FOR THE EIGHTIES
143-47 (1984).
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affect services, however. 13 In addition, the parties initiated a procedure for the
bilateral negotiation of issues not dealt with multilaterally, and some grievances
tabled along these lines did concern services. ' 4 Nevertheless, many were disap-
pointed by the results of the MTN in the services area. They attributed the lack of
substantial progress to the MTN's specific focus on non-tariff barriers to trade in
goods and to the lack of sufficient data regarding service industries and their
problems. ' 5
The past four years have seen slow yet significant progress. Despite the United
States' emphasis on services at the 1982 GATT ministerial meeting, 6 the joint
communique issued at meeting's end merely invited interested parties to study
services issues further and to exchange information among themselves through
organizations such as the GATT. 17 At the 1984 annual GATT meeting, however,
the United States succeeded in including services in the organization's work
program; the resulting GATT negotiating body formed to discuss trade in ser-
vices held its first formal meeting in January 1985.18 The new GATT round of
trade negotiations will almost certainly include discussion of services, despite the
objections of some developing countries that liberalization of trade in this area
will slow their economic growth. '9 Although the focus thus far has been upon
13. These include the agreement on customs valuation which concerns transport and construction
costs, and the agreement on technical barriers to trade which affects testing regulations. Id. at
148-53.
14. Parties tabled requests respecting regulations on insurance, transportation, preshipment inspec-
tion, motion pictures, radio and television commercials, and patents. Id. at 154-55.
15. See id. at 148; Cohen & Morante, Elimination of Nontariff Barriers to Trade in Services:
Recommendations for Future Negotiations, 13 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 495, 509 (1981); see also
Note, Threshold Problems, supra note 10, at 394 n. 156.
16. At their November 1981 session, the GATT contracting parties decided to convene their next
session at the ministerial level. American research on services issues was stepped up before the
meeting, and the United States submitted a number of topics to the ministers for prior consideration.
See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Briefing Packet: International Trade in Services (Nov.
1982) (available from Office of the USTR) [hereinafter cited as USTR Briefing Packet].
17. GATT Ministerial Meeting Communique, 7 U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) 301 (Dec. 1, 1982).
18. GAIT Body Begins Slowly in Discussion of Services Trade, 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 176
(Jan. 30, 1985).
19. See Lewis, U.S. Wins Trade Talk Go-Ahead, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1985, at 27. The new round,
starting in 1986, will last for several years. U.S. demands to include services in the negotiations are
supported by the European Community and Japan. India and Brazil lead the opposition. Id. But see
Chairman of 'Wise Men's' Panel Says Report Should Aid Summit Talks, 2 lrr'L TRADE REP. (BNA)
494 (Apr. 3, 1985) (a panel of GATT advisers, while recommending exploration of methods of
expanding services trade, remains pessimistic about short-term prospects for progress on services).
Private sector trade advisers, in a report to the USTR, also supported the inclusion of services in a
new round of talks. See Top Private Sector Trade Policy Advisers Approach New GAIT MTN Round
With Caution, 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 727-28 (May 29, 1985).
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services closely linked to trade in goods, such as banking and insurance, there is
greater consensus on the need for liberalization than in the past, as well as a
greater amount of information about the problem. 20
A number of unique features make the GATT an appropriate forum for multi-
lateral negotiations on trade in services. First, GATT concepts are familiar to all
parties-a problem that seems intractable at first may seem less so if it is
examined under the rubric of, for instance, most-favored-nation (MFN) analysis.
Second, GATT negotiating procedures have proven to be effective methods for
concluding multilateral agreements. Third, the GATT provides a process for
dispute settlement, as well as a venue for informal discussion (bilateral and
multilateral) of trade problems. 21 Finally, the GATT has a broad membership
which is formally committed to the reduction of trade barriers. 22 Although past
efforts have been generally unencouraging, recent commentary 23 and develop-
ments portend a promising future for negotiation of trade-in-services agreements
within the GATT framework.
II. BARRIERS TO TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PRACTICE
A wide array of barriers hinders trade in legal services; this note separates
them into four distinct types. 24 Type I barriers are intended to treat foreign law
firms and lawyers as foreign businesses. They include financial barriers such as
20. See Informal Session Makes Some Progress on Inclusion of Services in New Round, 2 INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) 494 (Apr. 3, 1985). For discussion of past difficulties, see R. KROMMENACKER,
supra note 12, at 156 and Note, Legal Problems, supra note 10, at 286 n.32.
21. R. KROMMENACKER, supra note 12, at 131. The GATT secretariat plays an essential role in
facilitating such discussions by monitoring and promoting progress in the negotiations and by acting
as a clearinghouse for proposals. Id. at 132.
22. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, U.S. NATIONAL STUDY ON TRADE IN
SERVICES: A SUBMISSION BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON
TARIFFS AND TRADE 48 (1984) [hereinafter cited as USTR SERVICES STUDY].
23. Raymond Krommenacker argues that the application of GATT principles is absolutely essential
for the reduction of barriers to services trade. R. KROMMENCKER, supra note 12, at 164. For other
optimistic assessments of the potential and advisability of a trade-in-services agreement under GATT,
see for example Brock, A Simple Plan for Negotiating on Trade in Services, 5 WORLD ECON. 229,
238 (1982); Cohen & Morante, supra note 15, at 516; and Note, Threshold Problems, supra note 10,
at 392. But see Gray, A Negotiating Strategy for Trade in Services, 17 J. WORLD TRADE L. 377,
385-87 (1983) (contending that the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development would
prove a better forum because its membership is restricted to developed countries, who have in-
creasingly service-oriented economies, and excludes developing countries, who would prefer to focus
upon trade in goods and to protect their infant service industries from external competition).
24. For country-by-country information on many of these barriers, see TRANSNATIONAL PRAC-
TICE, supra note 1, and S. CONE, supra note l.
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discriminatory taxes and restrictions on the repatriation of fees, 25 personnel hir-
ing restrictions,2 6 and rules regarding the use of firm names.
27
Type II barriers are designed to protect domestic lawyers from foreign com-
petition. All barriers are protectionist in some sense since their effect, generally,
is to limit foreign practice. Type II barriers, however, either openly reflect protec-
tionist motivations or have no other justification. These protectionist barriers
include regulations governing the length of stay or frequency of practice of
foreign lawyers, 2 the "needs" test (requiring proof of domestic demand for a
firm's particular talents before entry is allowed), 29 and restrictions on part-
nerships between domestic and foreign lawyers.30
Type III barriers are meant to protect the public from incompetent lawyers.
Some are designed to compensate for national differences in substantive and
procedural law. These measures include educational requirements such as cer-
tification by domestic legal educators, 3 and restrictions on the types of legal
advice foreign lawyers may provide.3 2 Laws requiring foreign lawyers to have a
minimum number of years of experience in their own countries also fall under
this heading. 33 Conflicts between different codes of ethics or professional respon-
sibility raise additional type III barriers. 14
Type IV barriers, which focus on the nationality of the legal practitioner, are,
on their face, the most discriminatory of all barriers against foreign lawyers, and
the most effective. Citizenship requirements35 and citizenship-based require-
ments such as visa and work permit requirements3 6 and ownership restrictions-
25. USTR Briefing Packet, supra note 16, at No. 14; Cohen & Morante, supra note 15, at 499;
Note, Legal Problems, supra note 10, at 301.
26. Cohen & Morante, supra note 15, at 499.
27. USTR Briefing Packet, supra note 16, at No. 14.
28. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Selected Problems Encountered by U.S. Service
Industries to Trade in Services 41 (Aug. 11, 1983) (unpublished computer printout) [hereinafter cited
as USTR, Selected Problems].
29. Note, Making Room, supra note I, at 1808.
30. USTR SERVICES STUoDY, supra note 22, at 148; USTR Briefing Packet, supra note 16, at No.
14; Note, Making Room, supra note 1, at 1783.
31. USTR SERVICES STUDY, supra note 22, at 148. For a detailed examination of European
Community perspectives on this issue, see J.-P. CRAYENCOUR, THE PROFESSIONS IN THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY 41-50 (1982).
32. Campbell & Coe, Introduction, in TRANSNATIONAL PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 14; Note,
Making Room, supra note 1, at 1778.
33. Note, Making Room, supra note I, at 1797.
34. See Lund, Problems and Developments in Foreign Practice, 59 A.B.A. J. 1154 (1973).
35. USTR SERVICES STUDY, supra note 22, at 148; Campbell & Coe, supra note 32, at 7-10;
Note, Making Room, supra note 1, at 1772-75.
36. USTR, Selected Problems, supra note 28, at 41.
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allowing only citizens to own property, 37 fall into this category, as do allegiance
requirements. 3
8
Not all the barriers listed above exist in every country. Nor do they affect all
practitioners; the New York lawyer meeting with a client in Geneva to discuss the
implications of a trust encounters few, if any, of the difficulties faced by the large
Washington law firm attempting to establish a branch office in Geneva. 39 A range
of intermediate situations exists, each raising idiosyncratic problems in the face
of liberalization efforts.
None of these barriers to foreign legal practice are necessary to the survival of
the local legal profession. Thriving, high-quality professions exist not only in the
United States and Japan, where regulations highly restrictive of practice by
foreigners are in force, 4 but also in the United Kingdom and France, where there
are relatively few obstacles to practice by foreign attorneys.
4'
Yet some barriers to foreign legal practice do seem to be more justified, and
hence more "rational," than others. The GATT's very existence reflects an
international consensus that economic protectionism is presumptively bad. The
GATT itself nevertheless recognizes that some barriers are justified. Blatantly
protectionist measures are allowed when they protect certain industries from
serious injury.42 Seemingly protectionist regulations are also permissible when
necessary to promote legitimate interests of the national government, including
certain economic, social, and national security goals. 43 Thus, a national govern-
ment's legitimate interest in insuring a high degree of reliability in the profes-
sions 44 might justify the imposition of type III barriers. Similarly, a government's
legitimate interest in controlling the movement of foreigners across national
37. USTR Briefing Packet, supra note 16, at No. 14.
38. Id. at 42.
39. See Brothwood, International Law Offices, 1979 J. Bus. L. 10; Campbell & Coe, supra note
32, at 2. The barriers discussed in this note rarely affect the practitioner who travels abroad to consult
with a client ad hoc on a specific matter, see Lund, supra note 34, at 1155, or who advises from his
home office a client abroad.
40. See generally Salkin, United States, in TRANSNATIONAL PRAcTICE, supra note I, at 355;
Fukuda, Japan, in TRANSNATIONAL PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 201.
41. See generally Costello, England and Wales, in TRANSNATIONAL PRACTICE, supra note 1, at
87; Debost, France, in TRANSNATIONAL PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 113.
42. See GATT, supra note 2, at art. XIX. This article, commonly known as the escape clause,
allows the suspension of obligations or the withdrawal or modification of concessions when serious
injury to domestic producers is caused or threatened as a result of obligations incurred under the
GATT.
43. See GATT, supra note 2, at art. XX (general exception to GATT obligations for measures that,
for example, are necessary to protect public morals or human, animal or plant life or health); GATT,
supra note 2, at art. XXI (security exceptions); see also infra text accompanying notes 53-56.
44. USTR SERVICES STUDY, supra note 22, at 148; Lund, supra note 34 passim; Note, Threshold
Problems, supra note 10, at 384.
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borders 45 might justify the imposition of type IV barriers. Multilateral negotia-
tions on legal services should attempt to eliminate unnecessary protectionist
barriers while minimizing the number and impact of rational barriers.
III. LIBERALIZATION OF THE BARRIERS
Most of the barriers to foreign legal practice can be analyzed under GATT
concepts. 46 National treatment should be the starting point for an agreement to
reduce barriers to trade in legal services. The MFN concept, a second-best
solution, 47 should control in situations where national treatment is not desirable
or practical.
48
A multilateral agreement on transnational legal practice could eliminate type I
and type II barriers, the major part of which are analogous to GATT-prohibited
45. See infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
46. The application of national treatment and MFN concepts to lawyering on the regional and
bilateral levels indicates that the concepts may be adaptable to global agreements as well. Regional
treaties applying national treatment to services in general include the Treaty of Rome and the Lomd
Convention, both of which formally endorse the abolition of restrictions, within their respective
communities, on the freedom of establishment and on the right to provide services. reaty Establish-
ing the European Economic Community, done Mar. 25, 1957, arts. 52, 59, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (1958);
Second ACP-EEC Convention of Lomd, Oct. 31, 1979, art. 160, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 347) 2,
54 (1980). (The Tieaty of Rome formed the EEC in 1957. The six original Member States were
Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Den-
mark, the Irish Republic, and the United Kingdom joined the Community on January 1, 1973. Greece
became the tenth Member State on January 1, 1981. In 1985, Spain and Portugal became Member
States. This note uses the term European Community (EC) in accordance with the resolution of the
European Parliament. Resolution on a single designation for the Community, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. C 63) 36 (1978). The Lomd Convention is an agreement between the EC and 46 African,
Caribbean, and Pacific states.)
All bilateral treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation (FCN treaties) prescribe as a standard
either national treatment or MFN treatment. FCN treaties set forth, among other things, the rights of
individuals and firms from one state doing business in the other. The United States is presently party
to FCN treaties with forty-three nations; each treaty normally treats services the same as other
businesses. Professional services, however, are restricted in most of the recent treaties, generally
through clauses requiring compliance with domestic education and competency standards by foreign
professionals interested in private practice. Professionals are generally allowed to provide support
services for businesses from their own state that are permitted the right of establishment in the other
state. Some treaties restrict lawyers alone among professionals. E. Arakaki, Treaties of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation and their Treatment of Service Industries (Feb. 2, 1981) (available from
Int'l Tade Admin., U.S. Dep't of Commerce ).
47. In a situation where foreign lawyers from Country X are given better treatment in Country Y
than Y's own lawyers, then MFN treatment would be preferred by Country Z's lawyers over national
treatment. Since this situation is nowhere forseeable, national treatment will always be more liberaliz-
ing than MFN treatment.
48. Such a situation is presented by type IV barriers, which focus on the nationality of the legal
practitioner. See infra text accompanying notes 58-61.
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obstacles to trade in goods. Other restrictions on foreign practice, such as educa-
tion-related type III barriers, are more analogous to regulations affecting goods
that are excepted under the GATT. Finally, the GATT framework is an inadequate
basis for an agreement liberalizing type IV barriers, which raise questions of
national sovereignty never confronted in the GATT negotiating framework.
Part A of this section discusses the applicability of GATT concepts to the
different types of barriers to transnational legal practice. Part B considers the
potential usefulness of GATT procedural mechanisms to the negotiation of an
agreement to liberalize trade in legal services.
A. GATT Concepts
The national treatment concept can most easily be applied to type I barriers.
GATT article III deals directly with internal taxes on products, which are clearly
analogous to internal taxes on services. 49 Restrictions on the repatriation of legal
fees accord foreign lawyers treatment less favorable than that accorded domestic
lawyers, thus discouraging foreign practitioners from offering their services for
sale. s' Personnel hiring restrictions and rules regarding the use of firm names
both afford protection to domestic firms. 5'
Type II barriers could be treated either as quotas or under national treatment
concepts. Economic protectionism is anathema to the GATT; barriers affording
such protection are contrary to the spirit of the Agreement. With a few narrow
exceptions, GATT article XI forbids the use of quotas on the importation of
goods.52 GATT's ban on quotas could be regarded as a specific interpretation of
the national treatment provision, since quantitative restrictions are laws or regula-
tions which affect the availability of imported products and afford protection to
domestic production.
The type II length-of-stay and frequency-of-practice regulations are, in effect,
quotas, limiting the amount of foreign lawyering allowed in a country. The needs
test is also a form of quota, fixing the number of lawyers according to the
government's assessment of domestic demand. Restrictions on partnership be-
tween domestic and foreign lawyers afford protection to domestic lawyers by
effectively limiting foreign lawyers' practice to certain types of law and clients,
and thus can be addressed through the national treatment concept.
49. See GAT, supra note 2, at art. III, para. 2.
50. See GAlT, supra note 2, at art. Ill, para. 4. The repatriation of legal fees may be an issue for
the International Monetary Fund or for individual FCN treaties, rather than for the GATT, since
currency movements are involved. GATT article XV requires the GATT parties to consult and
cooperate with the IMF on monetary questions. Still, the issue may fall under GATT jurisdiction
since paragraph 4 of article III was intended to have a broad reach. See J. JACKSON, supra note 11, at
288.
51. See GATT, supra note 2, at art. I11, para. I.
52. The exceptions relate mainly to agricultural products. See GATT, id. at art. XI, para. 2. Article
XII also allows restrictions to safeguard a country's balance of payments. See GATT, id. at art. XII.
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Of the four types of barriers, type III, intended to protect the public from
incompetent practitioners, are the most rational. 53 Differences between the legal
systems of any two countries often overwhelm similarities. Common and civil
law lawyers practicing in each other's jurisdictions must grasp the intricacies of
entirely different legal frameworks before they can even begin to grapple with the
distinct substantive and procedural precepts of the other system.
Such differences could theoretically remove all barriers to transnational legal
practice, including types I, II, and IV, from the purview of a GATT-style agree-
ment. Paragraph four of GATT article III only requires that foreign products
receive "treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of
national origin" (emphasis added). Similarly, GATT article I mandates the exten-
sion of MFN treatment only to like products from different foreign countries.
Proponents of protectionism might argue that foreign lawyers without compre-
hensive training in the host country are not functionally equivalent to domestic
lawyers, and thus are deserving of neither national treatment nor MFN treatment.
Those with a less protectionist viewpoint might limit application of the national
treatment and MFN clauses to lawyers from jurisdictions similar to their own.
For instance, a civil law country might opt to afford practitioners from other civil
law jurisdictions more privileges than it would to common law practitioners.
A better solution to the "like products" problem would be to designate type III
barriers as explicit exceptions to a multilateral agreement liberalizing transna-
tional legal practice. Although such action would not solve the problems caused
by differences between legal systems, it would prevent them from hopelessly
impeding the progress of multilateral negotiations and delaying indefinitely the
attainment of a comprehensive agreement. -
GATT article XX(b) allows measures "necessary to protect human. . . life or
health." Incompetent lawyers might jeopardize clients' legal rights and economic
security, just as faulty or dangerous goods might endanger citizens' lives and
health. Legal rights might not be exercised to full advantage because of unin-
formed counsel, or poor commercial decisions might be made on the basis of
faulty advice. Accordingly, an agreement on transnational legal practice could
include an exception for measures necessary to protect citizens' legal rights and
economic well-being. Under such an exception, educational requirements and
53. See supra text accompanying notes 42-45 for a discussion of why some barriers may be
considered rational.
54. The European Community has struggled with the issues for years in attempting to implement
articles 52 (right of establishment), 57 (mutual recognition of diplomas), and 59 (right to provide
services) of the Treaty of Rome, and has yet to arrive at a satisfactory solution. A Council of Europe
directive implementing the treaty language as applied to lawyering only addressed the freedom to
provide legal services, avoiding for the moment the problems related to the mutual recognition of
diplomas that a directive concerning the right of establishment would have raised. J.-P. CRAYEN-
COUR, supra note 31, at 96-100, 112-13. But see infra note 70 (questioning the function of the
educational barrier).
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type-of-advice restrictions would be exempt from the agreement's national treat-
ment and MFN provisions.
An exception clause could also be used to reconcile conflicts in national codes
of ethics or professional responsibility. The codes serve to protect clients and
preserve the legal profession's reputation. 55 An International Bar Association
study group has recommended that foreign lawyers be required to abide by local
codes of ethics, with the local code prevailing when conflicts with lawyers' home
codes arise. 56 Such an arrangement could be allowed under an exception clause
permitting measures necessary to protect citizens' legal rights and professionals'
reputations.
Years-of-experience requirements are the only type III barriers that ought to be
eliminated using national treatment concepts. Like educational requirements,
these rules are designed to protect the public. Given the widespread use of other
type III barriers, however, experience requirements are not necessary to afford
adequate protection. The requirements are also quite possibly ineffective or even
counterproductive. 57 Lengthy experience is not a sure indication of a high quality
domestic practice, much less the ability to master a foreign legal system. Exclu-
sion of young, yet highly-qualified foreign lawyers serves no state's interests.
The GATT conceptual framework is inadequate to structure an agreement
reducing nationality-based type IV barriers. The issues raised by these barriers
"touch and concern national sovereignty far more than free trade.""8 Control
over the entry of foreigners into the country and their direct participation in the
economy is a widely recognized concomitant of sovereignty.5 9 While trade in
legal services may require foreign lawyers to establish themselves in the country
of their clients, trade in goods does not require the presence of foreign producers
in the importing country. 60 The GATT, therefore, does not address nationality
issues, and thus there are no true GATT analogies to type IV barriers. Still, an
55. See Note, Making Room, supra note 1, at 1803.
56. See Lund, supra note 34, at 1155.
57. See Note, Making Room, supra note 1, at 1797 n. 162.
58. Note, Legal Problems, supra note 10, at 302.
59. "A state is under no duty, in the absence of treaty obligations, to admit aliens to its territory. If
it does admit them, it may do so on such terms and conditions as may be deemed by it to be consonant
with its national interests .... These are incidents of sovereignty." 3 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 717 (1942).
60. Tade in services can be separated into two basic categories. "Establishment trade" generally
requires the physical presence of the supplier in the importing country. Examples include medical
services, accounting, advertising, and retail trade. Tourism and education are examples of establish-
ment trade requiring the presence of the consumer in the supplying country. "Across-the-border
trade" allows both suppliers and consumers to remain in their respective countries. Examples include
insurance, port services, telecommunications, brokering, passenger transport, film services, and
information services. Note, Threshold Problems, supra note 10, at 382-83. Trade in legal services
may take place on either level; this note is specifically concerned with establishment trade. See supra
note 39.
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agreement on transnational legal practice based on GATT concepts could require
MFN treatment with regard to all type IV restrictions. Although such a policy
would not ensure any specific degree of liberalization-all foreigners could be
harshly yet equally discriminated against-it would bring the barriers under the




As shown above, the central GATT substantive concepts of national treatment,
MFN, quota, and exception are applicable and adaptable to an agreement reduc-
ing barriers to transnational legal services. Such an agreement might incorporate
GATT procedural concepts as well. 62 Three aspects of the agreement's procedural
framework are relevant: the method of negotiating; the underlying goal of reci-
procity; and the dispute settlement mechanisms.
A legal services agreement might be achieved by adapting the negotiating
procedure utilized during the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations.
Each party would first make a list of the barriers to trade in legal services that it
faces abroad, and a list of the barriers that it presently imposes that it would be
willing to eliminate. Negotiators would then use these lists as springboards for
agreement on the reduction or elimination of specific barriers.
63
The "linear technique," introduced at the Kennedy Round of negotiations, is
another possible method which might be adopted. Talks would start with an
across-the-board proposal. Parties would then table exceptions and proceed to
negotiate counter-exceptions. 64 For instance, all countries might initially agree to
eradicate all type I financial barriers, after which some might try to negotiate
exceptions for certain discriminatory taxes. Both the Tokyo and Kennedy Round
negotiating techniques have the advantage of familiarity; trade negotiators are
61. U.S. negotiators want establishment trade dealt with under the GATT. See Note, Legal
Problems, supra note 10, at 302.
Citizenship requirements have been eliminated in a number of countries. In In re Griffiths, 413
U.S. 717 (1973), the U.S. Supreme Court held that U.S. citizenship as a prerequisite to bar admission
is unconstitutional. The European Court of Justice found citizenship requirements contrary to the
Treaty of Rome in Reyners v. Belgian State, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 631; 2 Common Mkt. L.R.
305. The Supreme Court of Mexico held unconstitutional a law requiring citizenship for practice in
federal matters. S. CONE, supra note 1, at 92. The United Kingdom and Japan have also recently
removed citizenship requirements with regard to solicitors and lawyers, respectively. Campbell &
Coe, supra note 32, at 7. In spite of these developments, however, citizenship requirements are still
common. See supra note 35.
62. Former U.S. Trade Representative William Brock has argued that GATT procedures would be
adaptable to a general multilateral agreement on trade in services. Brock, supra note 23, at 238-39.
63. Cf J. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 477 (1977);
Cohen & Morante, supra note 15, at 516; Note, Threshold Problems, supra note 10, at 387 (describ-
ing Tokyo Round negotiating techniques).
64. Cf J. JACKSON, supra note 63, at 477 (describing Kennedy Round negotiating techniques).
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accustomed to the idiosyncracies of each system. They may, therefore, be more
likely to reach agreement than they would if a different system were employed.
Reciprocity, an underlying concept in all GATT tariff negotiations, will un-
doubtedly play a role in the negotiation of a legal services agreement. GATT
contracting parties agreed to conduct all negotiations on "a reciprocal and mutu-
ally advantageous basis." 65 The concept is not specifically invoked in negotia-
tions; rather, all parties are aware that concessions require counter-concessions.
However, due to the difficulty of ascertaining the true value of concessions,
criteria for measuring reciprocity in goods negotiations have not been well-
developed. 66
In contrast, reciprocity has obtained a clearer meaning in the context of trans-
national legal practice. France enacted a provision in 1971 that allows certain
types of legal practice in France by citizens of a country that grants, without
restriction, the right to engage in the same type of practice to French lawyers .67
New York responded to the new French provision by enacting court rules allow-
ing foreign lawyers to practice as "legal consultants" without a U.S. law school
diploma or admission to the New York bar. 68 A number of other countries have
formal reciprocity provisions. 69 The widespread usage which the concept of
reciprocity already enjoys in the regulation of legal services trade should facili-
tate the application of the GATT conceptual framework to the outstanding prob-
lems of transnational legal practice. 70
65. GATT, supra note 2, at art. XXVIII (bis), para. i.
66. See J. JACKSON, supra note 11, at 241-45. Non-tariff barriers (such as the ones described in
this note) are especially difficult to quantify, as no specific dollar amount is attached to them. Note,
Threshold Problems, supra note 10, at 395 n. 164.
67. Loi no. 71-1130, art. 55, Journal Officiel, 5 janvier 1972 (Fr.) (Law pertaining to the reform of
certain legal professions).
68. See N.Y. R. Cr. § 521 (McKinney 1984). California, Illinois, and Pennsylvania have all
rejected similar proposals. See Note, Making Room, supra note 1, at 1787. The District of Columbia
Court of Appeals is presently considering a proposal, made initially in 1977 by the D.C. Bar and
renewed in 1984, to allow foreign lawyers to serve as special legal consultants in the District of
Columbia. The Assistant Executive Director of the D.C. Bar expects the proposal to be adopted.
Telephone conversation with David Dorsey, Assistant Executive Director, District of Columbia Bar
(July 8, 1985) (notes on file, Michigan Yearbook of International Legal Studies). The D.C. proposal
is based on the New York foreign legal consultant provision. District of Columbia Bar, Draft
Memorandum for the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 4 (Dec. 3, 1984) (Proposed Amendment
to Rule 46 to Provide for Licensing of Legal Consultants) [hereinafter cited as D.C. Bar Memoran-
dum].
69. See, e.g., S. CONE, supra note 1, at 48 (Belgium); id. at 49 (Brazil); id. at 70 (France);
Echegoyen, Spain, in TRANSNATIONAL PRACriCE, supra note I, at 332. The D.C. Bar proposal, see
supra note 68, contains an unusual informal reciprocity provision. It recommends that the oppor-
tunities for practice by D.C. lawyers in a particular foreign country be taken into account when an
application by an attorney from that country is considered. D.C. Bar Memorandum, id. at 2, 3. No
rigid standards are proposed, however. Id. at 2.
70. In addition to facilitating the liberalization of all four types of barriers through GAIT concepts,
the existence of the reciprocity standards enunciated by various countries raises a question as to the
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Dispute resolution within the GATT is a twofold process. Countries are first
obligated under article XXII to consult one another on any matter affecting
GATT obligations. Problems that defy solution in this manner are then dealt with
through the dispute settlement procedures of article XXIII, which authorize the
suspension of GATT obligations in response to unfair conduct. This two-step
process seems well-suited to the resolution of conflicts arising under trade liber-
alization agreements. Although GATT dispute settlement procedures have been
severely hampered by the vague wording of article XXIII, 71 the problems might
be avoided by judicious drafting of an agreement on trade in legal services.
Indeed, many of the MTN agreements contain redrafted or totally restructured
dispute settlement procedures instead of the extant GATT procedures.
72
IV. CONCLUSION
The substantive concepts and procedural mechanisms of the GATT framework
could be employed in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement regulating trade
in legal services. Of course, such an agreement could be reached completely
outside the GATT system. However, the likelihood of negotiations on trade in
legal services occurring outside of the GATT forum appears slim. GATT has
proved the forum of choice for global trade negotiations, and transnational legal
practice is not so pressing an issue as to cause precedent to be shattered. Al-
though the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
seriousness of the educational problems which type III barriers are meant to deal with. The French
Law of 1971, see supra note 67 and accompanying text, allows any foreigner to give advice regarding
non-French law and international law by registering as a conseil juridique. A registered foreigner
from a country granting reciprocity can dispense advice on French law as well. Debost, supra note
41, at 122. Parliamentary debates show that the French Government hoped that the extended range of
practice would serve as an incentive for other countries to grant reciprocity. The opposition called it
an "unjustified privilege" and warned of American "imperialism." Comment, The Reform of the
French Legal Profession: A Comment on the Changed Status of Foreign Lawyers, 11 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 435, 445 (1972).
The tenor of the debate seems to imply that economic protectionism is the cause of all important
barriers to legal trade between the two countries. Neither side expressed any concern over the
competence of foreign lawyers in domestic law. France is not the only country which sets no
educational barriers before lawyers from reciprocity-granting countries. See, e.g., Echegoyen, Spain,
in TRANSNATIONAL PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 327, 332. Perhaps the problems presented by type III
barriers are not as intractable as they seem at first blush.
71. The article is ambiguous as to exactly what procedures are required or allowable. In addition,
the tripwire phrase "nullification or impairment," which sets in motion the article XXIII machinery,
is itself highly ambiguous. Jackson, GATT Machinery and the Tokyo Round Agreements, in TRADE
POLICY IN THE 1980s, at 180-82 (W. Cline ed. 1983); Note, Threshold Problems, supra note 10, at
406. For a contrary opinion on the "so-called weakness of the system," see R. KROMMENACKER,
supra note 12, at 125, 139 n.45.
72. Seven of the eleven major MTN agreements, including the important Antidumping and
Subsidies-Countervailing Duty Agreements, contain explicit dispute settlement provisions. Jackson,
supra note 71, at 185.
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whose members represent a majority of the world's legal practitioners, 7 3 might
provide a useful forum for research and consensus-building, it has proved an
ineffective forum for negotiations. 
7 4
Recent actions of GATT signatories suggest that the GATT framework will, in
the future, likely be used to regulate trade in services. That regulation could take
a number of forms.75 Individual sectoral agreements could be reached for each
type of service: an insurance code, a legal services code, an advertising code,
and so on. Alternatively, a general services code could be drawn up, with or
without auxiliary agreements for specific sectors. Sectoral agreements would be
most effective, being better able to address the idiosyncratic barriers each service
faces (educational requirements, for instance, pose little problem for providers of
most services); a general code, however, would be most efficient.
A general code coupled with auxiliary agreements would strike a balance
between effectiveness and efficiency. Legal services might be covered in a sepa-
rate auxiliary agreement, or in the context of a larger agreement on professional
services (including law, medicine, and accounting). Whatever the form of the
accord, and whatever the forum, it is clear that a multilateral agreement regulat-
ing trade in legal services can be achieved using the GATT conceptual and
procedural framework.
73. The OECD is composed of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, the Irish Republic, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. Yugoslavia is a member with special status.
74. See R. SHELP, supra note 10, at 174. The OECD has discussed services since its inception,
with little result. See id. at 127-36, 160. Recently, however, the organization has launched new
initiatives in its study of services issues. See id. at 174-77. Ronald Shelp suggests using the OECD's
work as "a tool to build a foundation for future negotiations" within the GATT framework. Id. at 176,
189-92.
75. For comprehensive comparisons of the possible negotiation approaches, see R. KROM-
MENACKER, supra note 12, at 162-80 and R. SHELP, supra note 10, at 184-204. See also Cohen &
Morante, supra note 15, at 515-17; Note, Threshold Problems, supra note 10, at 402; Note, Legal
Problems, supra note 10, at 291-94.
